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BOOK REVIEWS

Love Disconsoled: Meditations on Christian Charity by Timothy P. Jackson.
Cambridge University Press, 1999. Pp. 254 + xiii. Cloth $59.95.
TERENCE CUNEO, Free University, Amsterdam
In the opening pages of Love Disconsoled, Timothy Jackson dedicates his
book to the memory of Paul Ramsey and to Richard Rorty. It is a most
unusual coupling, and deeply revelatory of the spirit and content of Love
Disconsoled. For as Jackson explains, Love Disconsoled is an extended effort
to blend Ramsey's orthodox Christian sensibilities with Rortian irony. The
fundamental goal of Jackson's book is to defend tlLe traditional Christian
claim that charity is the first among the virtues without falling prey to
"false consolations" such as the Boethian claim that charity is invulnerable
to evil, or the Pauline claim that Christian charity somehow requires the
immortality of the soul. The result is an extremely interesting, elegantly
written, and sometimes unpredictable meditation on the nature of
Christian charity.
Roughly the first half of the book is devoted to defending the claim that
charity is the primary value or the "metavalue". In the first chapter,
"Biblical Keys to Love", Jackson sketches an account of what charity is, and
how it relates to love of self and neighbor. On Jackson's view, to have caritas is to (1) be unconditionally committed to the good of others, (2) regard
equally the well-being of others, and (3) passionately serve others in a
manner that is opelL to self-sacrifice for the sake of others (p. 15). To claim
that charity thus understood is the primary value is to say two things. First,
it is to claim that charity is primary in the sense of being joundational.
Charity is that value the instantiation of which is a necessary condition of
our participating in those goods that constitute our flourishing. Jackson's
claim here is not simply that apart from God's exercising God's agapic love
there would be no other created goods. Nor is it merely that apart from
Christ's atoning sacrifice sin would not be forgiven. Rather, Jackson
defends the stronger view that hllman flourishing is impossible apart from
the humalL exercise of charity. Apart from the exercise of unmerited care
from our fellow human beings, none of us would have developed the
capacities requisite for participating iIL the numerous goods that comprise
human flourishing. Moreover, apart from the exercise of charity, the participation in goods such as erotic love and friendship inevitably go awry.
Second, to claim that charity is the primary value is to say that charity is
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the unrivaled telos of the moral and spiritual life. Charity is that value
which all of us ought to strive to exemplify to the highest degree, and
which defeats all rivals. Consequently, in any instance in which the exercise of charity comes into conflict with the realization of other goods - and
Jackson readily concedes there are such conflicts - charity trumps.
The next three chapters illustrate various features of the priority of charity. Chapter two is a close reading of Ernest Hemingway's The Garden of
Eden and F. Scott Fitzgerald's Tender is the Night. It is a provocative and
rich chapter whose aim is to Pllt before us in stark form two stories in
which the loves become disordered absent the leavening effect of charity.
In what is perhaps the finest chapter of the book, "Th.e Five Loves",
Jackson offers a nuanced interpretation of four figures: Freud, Augustine,
Simone Weil, and Edward Vacek. Jackson's claim is that all four figures
misunderstand the relation of charity to the other loves, and the sense in
which charity is primary. Jackson's diagnosis of both Freud's and
Augustin.e's views on charity is that neither gives a plausible reckoning of
charity's relation to eros. For Freud, charity is "aim-inhibited eros", a defective love which tries to rein in eros (p. 72). For Augustine, charity is "aimermanced eros", a love which is (in part) erotic desire chalmeled toward
God (p. 61). Jackson's diagIlosis of Weil and Vacek is that neither gives a
plausible account of the relation which charity bears to love of self and
friendship respectively. Weil attempts to reconcile love of self and charity
by propounding Buddhist-like annihilation of the self. Vacek, by contrast,
reduces charity to a type of friendship, viz., friendship with God. In opposition to these authors, Jackson takes amiddie course. Jackson contends
that charity is neither fundamentally at odds with any of these loves nor a
mere variant of them.
Chapter four, "Love, abomination, and liberation", is a caH to restore to
our moral conceptual schemes the notions of 'abomination' and 'liberation'. The guiding idea here is that since the "morallexicon shapes the
contours of our self-understanding, to define the limits of that lexicon in
terms of 'abomination' and 'liberation' is to begin to comprehend the worst
and best we are or may be" (p. 96). Jackson argues that we should not simply adopt ordinary (conservative and liberal) uses of these concepts.
Rather, he claims that both notions have to be reconfigured, and understood in terms of charity. The abominable, says Jackson, should be understood as whatever ultimately thwarts the human capacity for love while
the liberating is whatever fLlndamentally expands it (p. 96). Once again,
charity is put forth as the metavalue - that value in terms of which we are
to understand the worst evils and the most magnificent triumphs.
Having defended the claim that charity is the metavalue, in the next
three chapters, Jackson clarifies what this claim does not entail. First, it does
not entail "Axiological Optimism", the view according to which claims
about the priority of charity rest on indubitable epistemological foundations. Jackson hastens to add that the rejection ofAxiological Optimism is
perfectly compatible with espousing a robust form of moral realism, and
rejecting Hemingway's moral pessimism according to which "we are all
bitched from the start". Second, claiming that clLarity is the metavalue does
not entail that charity is self-sLlfficient, the solum bonum. There are other
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loves and other goods that, when all goes well, work in concert with charity. Charity is, nevertheless, the summum bonum. Third, the priority of charity does not entail that love is invulnerable to the evils of this world. To the
contrary, Jackson admits that there are evils of such great magnitude tl1at
they can "unmake" (to use Elaine Scarry's term) a person's humanity, rendering the giving and receiving of human love impossible for that person.
Nevertheless, Jackson maintains that there are limits to this vulnerability.
The proponent of strong agape (i.e., the CI1fistian believer who accepts the
priority of love) strongly doubts, for instance, that there are any genuine
moral dilemmas. On the strong agapist's view, love cannot suffer decisive
harm unto damnation; human agents cannot be compelled to sin through
no antecedent fault of their own lest we give up on the goodness of God (p.
147). However, Jackson admits that the rejection of genuine dilemmas
remains more of an article of faith for the strong agapist than a conclusion
based on decisive philosophical considerations. Finally, and most controversially, charity's primacy does not entail that the strong agapist should
maintain that there is an afterlife in which charity is rewarded. Though
immortality remains a "blessed hope" it has ultimately nothing to do with
charity, and can even serve to inhibit the proper expression of charity.
Practicing charity is its own reward.
There is a great deal to like about this book. It is extraordinarily learned
and imaginative - rich in references from literature, poetry, philosophy,
theology, art, and psychology. (The book includes, for example, prints of
paintings by Guido Reni and William Blake together with intelligent interpretations by Jackson.) That said, it should be noted that, although Jackson
is a trained pl1ilosopher, his style of argument is often more illustrative
than systematic. Consequently, I imagine that some philosopl1ers will not
be entirely satisfied with various aspects of Jackson's discussion.
First, Jackson defends some claims that appear overly strong. For exampIe, Jackson contends that charity is primary in the sense that 'fit is a necessary condition for the enjoyment of goods such as happiness" and "other
human goods" (pp. 20, 25). But that seems an overstatement on certain
assumptions that Jackson adopts, viz., that exercising charity requires
equally regarding the well-being of others (pp. 15, 212). It seems possible
that a person might be happy in the "modern more or less Kantian" sense
(p. 20) or participate in goods such as friendship without equally regarding
the well-being of others. In addition, some of Jackson's more controversial
claims seem to me misleading in some senses and unpersuasive in others.
In particular, Jackson's attempt to detach traditional notions of immortality
from the exercise of charity seems to me ablend of the misleading and the
unconvincing. So, let me close by examining Jackson's claim on this score.
Jackson asks us to consider two claims
(1)

The desire for eternal life ought to be a significant motive for
practicing cl1arity (p. 155).

(2)

If someone practices charity (i.e., loves God and others), then
that person will enjoy eternallife (pp. 151, 157).
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On Jackson's view, the strong agapist should simply deny (1). As for (2),
Jackson claims in some places that the strong agapist needn't "insist" on or
be "certain" of (2) (pp. 157, 159). In other places, Jackson says that the exercise of charity can be "coherent" or "justified" even if (2) is false, and that
the antecedent of (2) does not"directly entail" its consequent (pp. 151, 153,
158, 163, 30, 133). Let me call the thesis that the strong agapist ought to
insist on (2) the "in.sistence claim". Accordingly, let me call the thesis that
the antecedent of (2) directly entails its consequent the "entailment claim".
Jackson is, in my estimation, correct to contend that the strong agapist
should reject the claim expressed in (I). He is also, I believe, correct to say
that we ought to reject the entailment claim as it is expressed in (2). (Of
course this is not say that (2) is false; it is only to say that, if it is true, it is
not true by virtue of th.e mere fact that what its antecedent explicitly states
is true.) Nevertheless, there are at least three places where Jackson's discussion of these two claims seems to me to go astray.
First, though I take Jackson to be correct to reject the entailment
claim, I think that the rationale he offers for rejecting it is wrong. Th.e
primary reason that Jackson offers for rejectin.g this claim is that "charity
is its own reward" (p. 159): even if eternal life were not the "inherent
consummation" of practicing charity, this would not "evacuate present
love of all meaning" (p. 159) or imply that "life is wretched" or "meaningless" (p. 157). But that seems to me beside the point. Claiming that
charity is its own reward in this sense does not count against the truth of
the entailment claim. It could still be the case that, necessarily, the
antecedent of (2) directly entails its consequent, and that charity is its
own reward. (An analogy: it may be that honesty is its own reward but
God has set up the world in such a way that, necessarily, every honest
act eventuates in a chorus of angelic hallelujahs.)
Second, as Jackson reads them, both C.S. Lewis and St. Paul embrace the
entailment claim. Now it is true that Lewis states that everlasting life is the
"very consummation of earthly discipleship".1 But I cannot see that this
commits Lewis to the entailment clain1.. Nor can I find any evidence that
St. Paul adopts the claim. Some things that Jackson says, however, ll1.dicate
that he interprets Lewis and St. Paul to espouse this somewhat different
thesis which he takes to be false:
(3)

If there is no resurrection of the dead, then our present love is
evacuated of meaning, and our lives are wretched (p. 157).

(I assume that the resurrection of the dead implies immortality in the
traditional sense.) But, again, I can find no evidence that Lewis explicitly en1.braces (3). St. Paul, admittedly, does appear to embrace (3) when
he writes in 1 Cor~ 15:29-30 that "[i]f the dead are not raised ... why are
we putting ourselves in danger every hour? If the dead are not raised
'Let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die"'. But it's important to see
that when St. Paul talks about the resurrection of the dead here, he is
also talking about Christ's resurrection. If I understand it right, Paul's
argument is this: If there is no resurrection of the dead, then Christ has
not been raised fron1. the dead. But if Christ has not been raised from the
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dead, then our lives are pitiable. We are still mired in our sin, objects of
divine wrath, false witnesses, responsible for many unnecessary and
cruel deaths, without hope for our own resurrection, and shall have
been wasting our time preaching the gospel (I Cor. 15: 12-33; Eph. 2:3).
On this reading, Paul accepts an interpretation of (3) in which its
antecedent refers to both Christ's resurrection and the resurrection of
those who believe in Christ. To my knowledge, Paul does not consider,
let alone embrace, a construal of (3) in which its antecedent refers to only
the resurrection of the faithfu!, and which also assurnes that Christ has
been raised from the dead. Accordingly, it seen1S to me that Jackson
attributes to St. Paul a view which he does not explicitly or implicitly
hold. Thus, there seen1S to me inadequate grounds for chiding Paul for
endorsing a "vitalism in which meaning requires permanence" (p. 157).
Nor does Paul's claim in (3) (as 1 have understood it) seem to me something about which the strong agapist should be particularly suspicious.
Once we eliminate Christ's resurrection from the content of the Christian
faith, there is, 1 believe, a clear sense in which Christian charity is evacuated of its meaning. There is also a clear sense, 1 think, in which apart
from Christ's resurrection, the early Christians, at least, had reason to
despair.
Third, 1 find Jackson's reasons for rejecting what I've called the "insistence claim/l unpersuasive. Jackson believes that, rather than insist on
(2), it is better for the strong agapist "to keep immortality-as-personalendlessness a pure hope, a vague intuition/intimation" (p. 167). 1
believe that we are offered a false dichotomy here. There is plenty of
conceptual space for propositional attitudes that fall between insisting
that a claim is true and merely hoping tl'lat it is true - among which is
firmly believing it is true. Moreover, contrary to what Jackson appears to
suggest, it may be that some of us ought for n1oral, religious and epistemic reasons to insist that (2) is true. Presumably, St. Paul and the early
Christians had good reason to believe that Christ himself had promised
eternallife (in the traditional sense) to those who love him. 2 If this is
right, it is arguable that St. Pau!, the apostles and the early Christians
had eXCellel'lt epistemic, moral and religious reasons to insist on the resurrection of the dead. Likewise, 1 believe it is plausible to hold that
strong agapists wl'lo stal'ld squarely in the orthodox Christian tradition
today have similar reasons for insisting on the truth of this claim. None
of this is to deny that insisting on (2) can function as a "false comfort/l
and lead to "cruelty/l and a denigration of this life (p. 169). But that
would not warrant Jackson's Rortian claim that it's best to "change the
subject when the topic of heaven arise8./I It would merely warrant a certain degree of caution and candor on the part of the strong agapist.
After all, our allegiance to the other loves can and often does function as
a false consolation al'ld as an occasion for "cruelty/l (p. 169). But we
don't take that as a good reason for not insisting on the centrality and
goodness of these other loves. What is called for, it seems, is a commitment to charity in which charity itself purifies our commitment to other
loves and doctrines.
Let me make a final poiI'lt. At the outset of the book, Jackson states
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that love's priority in1.plies the "moral irrelevance of an afterlife" (p. 30;
cf. also p. 133). That seems to me mistaken. As Jackson himself notes,
philosophers such as Robert and Marilyn Adams have plausibly claimed
that a loving God acting in. character would grant us lives (or at least
ample opportunity to have lives) that are a great good to us on the
whole. But many of us (e.g., those who have participated in horrendous
evils) appear not to have lives (or ample opportunity to have lives) that
are a great good to us on the whole. But if that's right, the reality of an
afterlife does appear to be morally relevant. It appears to be of crucial
moral importance insofar as it vouchsafes the loving kindness of God.
Jackson dem-urs. He claims that "[t]he possibility of love [that doesn't
imply an afterlife] is all that even an infinite Charity can offer a finite
creature. And presumably it was once possible (however early in their
careers) for all human beings to be or become agapic lovers" (p. 173). I
am inclined to think that it is false that it was once possible (in any interestingly restrictive sense) for all human beings to become agapic lovers
in this life. Moreover, I cannot see how it could be true that the mere
possibility of becoming or being an agapie lover is all that a good God
could offer uso Surely, as Jackson admits elsewhere, a good God could
offer us eternallife. Finally, it seems to me that Jackson's stated position
grates against some of our deepest moral intuitions. It is, I believe, very
plausible to hold that a loving God would offer us (ampleopportunity
for having) lives that are on the whole a great good. B1.1t it is doubtful
that a person's having the mere potential to practice charity (or even
practicing charity) implies that that person's life is good for her on the
whole. If that's right, "inJü1.ite Charity", on Jackson's view, is much less
than the title indicates. 3
NOTES
1. "The Weight of Glory" in The Weight ofGlory and Other Essays (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1979), p. 3.
2. On pp. 163-167, Jackson considers the possibility that Christ did not
promise eternal life in the traditional sense, but only in some less robust
sense in which "eternal life" refers to a special mode of God's presence in
the here and now. Jackson claims that when we examine what Christ says
about the issue, it is unclear as to what Christ actually did promise about
eternallife. Perhaps so. But in this respect, the scriptural text concerning
Christ's promises about eternallife is no different than Christ's claims, say,
to be God the Son. It seems that when we consider how we should understand many of the central claims of the Christian faith (e.g., the trinity, the
incarnation, the atonement, etc.), we must rely on the Pauline epistles, the
Creeds, and the Christian tradition. And it is clear, 1 think, that the Pauline
epistles, the Creeds, and the tradition unequivocally support the view that
Christ promised eternallife in the traditional sense.
3. My thanks to Andrew Cuneo for discussion of these matters, and
especially, Tim Jackson for helping me to understand better his views, and
saving me from errors in interpretation.

